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THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DEVELOPMENTS ON SEXUAL MINORITY RIGHTS
ARTHUR S. LEONARD*
International law rarely has played a role in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.  Recently, however, the Court has indicated a new
willingness to look outside the borders of the United States to other
tribunals’ analysis in examining the issue of anti-sodomy laws.  This
evolution, illustrated in the shift in reasoning between Bowers v.
Hardwick1 and Lawrence v. Texas,2 presents exciting possibilities for
the development of sexual minority rights.
On June 30, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to Georgia’s felony sodomy law in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.3  Justice Byron White invoked a history of universal
disapproval of homosexual conduct to find that the presumed
moral views of Georgia’s citizens provided a rational basis for such a
law, rejecting the argument that engaging in such conduct could be
protected under the Due Process Clause.4  Concurring, Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger invoked “millennia of moral teaching.”5
But there was hardly an international consensus in 1986 about
whether such conduct should be penalized.  Consensual sodomy
was decriminalized in the French Code Napoleon early in the nine-
teenth century.  Since World War II, the trend in Europe and in
countries elsewhere influenced by European legal developments
had been towards greater recognition of personal privacy and re-
form of sodomy laws.  During the 1950s, a parliamentary committee
in England recommended decriminalization, and in 1967, the Par-
liament acted on the recommendation for England, Scotland, and
Wales.  The failure to decriminalize in Ireland led to litigation
under the European Convention on Human Rights, which in Arti-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.  This essay is based on a presentation
at New York Law School as part of Faculty Presentation Day, March 3, 2004.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
4. Id. at 192-94.
5. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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cle 8 requires that member states show appropriate respect for the
private lives of their citizens.  In 1981, the European Court of
Human Rights found the Irish sodomy law offensive to this funda-
mental guarantee in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.6  Thus, when Bow-
ers was decided in 1986, the country whose law was the source of
American sodomy laws had decriminalized sodomy, partly respond-
ing to a ruling by a multinational human rights tribunal.
To the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986, this would have been irre-
levant.  Determining the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
was solely a matter of interpreting American constitutional text and
tradition.  The Court rarely paid heed to constitutional or statutory
developments in other countries, or to interpretations of interna-
tional conventions and charters that were not part of self-executing
U.S. law.  Although our Declaration of Independence called upon
the “opinions of mankind” to witness the justice of our break from
England, the opinions of mankind were generally deemed irrele-
vant to judicial construction of American constitutional law.
Seventeen years later, on June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court
overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.7  Much of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion was devoted to explaining why Bowers was wrong at the time
it was decided.  After pointing out flaws in Justice White’s historio-
graphy, Justice Kennedy noted developments in England and
under the European Convention, specifically citing Dudgeon, to
make the point that there was, even in 1986, an emerging interna-
tional view that such laws violated basic human rights.  Justice Ken-
nedy said that the Dudgeon decision was “at odds with the premise
in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our West-
ern civilization.”8
This drew an angry response from Justice Antonin Scalia in dis-
sent.  “The Court’s discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of
course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions
on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta,” he wrote. “Dangerous
dicta,” he added, “since ‘this Court should not impose foreign
6. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981).  The preceding historical account is taken from
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
7. 539 U.S. 558.
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.  Justice White had stated that Hardwick’s claim that
engaging in gay sex was protected under the right of privacy was “facetious” in light of
the history. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
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moods, fads, or fashions on Americans,’” quoting from Justice Clar-
ence Thomas’s statement concerning a certiorari petition in an-
other recent case.9
Was the Court’s decision imposing “foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans?” Were the references to the European
Court of Human Rights and English law reform “meaningless
dicta?”  Justice Kennedy did not purport to base Lawrence on the
statements of the European Court of Human Rights.  Unlike the
European Convention, the U.S. Constitution lacks any express ref-
erence to “respect for private life.”  But Justice Kennedy used Euro-
pean Convention terminology as part of his rhetoric when he
wrote: “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”10  Clearly, Justice
Kennedy and the justices who agreed to sign his opinion11 were
comfortable with importing a concept from an international
human rights source into their interpretation of the boundaries of
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause.
On September 18, 2003, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg deliv-
ered a lecture at the University of Idaho titled “Looking Beyond
Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitu-
tional Adjudication.”12  Her theme was that although the United
States was at one time almost alone in “exposing laws and official
acts to judicial review of constitutionality,” over the past century a
new situation had emerged in which “national, multinational, and
international human rights charters and tribunals today play a key
part in a world with increasingly porous borders.  . . .  We are the
9. Justice Thomas’s opinion was not an opinion by the Court, but rather a com-
ment concurring with a denial of certiorari and thus of no precedential significance.
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n.* (2002), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598.  Justice
Scalia’s parenthetical reference to countries that retain sodomy laws fails to specify the
countries, of course, because they are mainly theocratic dictatorships, usually of Islamic
background.  All of the major western democracies have abolished laws against consen-
sual sodomy.
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
11. Also signing the Court’s opinion were Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsberg and
Stevens.  Justice O’Connor concurred in a separate opinion on other grounds. See Law-
rence, 539 U.S. 558.
12. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003).
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losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from
others.”13
The emergence of the Internet, with easy access to court deci-
sions from all the major constitutional democracies, as well as by
international tribunals such as the European Courts of Human
Rights and of Justice and the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, has made it increasingly easy to share such experiences.
Foreign courts frequently cite and discuss decisions by the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the courts of other countries, in contrast to the
paucity of reciprocal citation and discussion by our courts.  In
South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain,
nations with whom we share the common law tradition, the courts
regularly pay attention to developments in the United States.14
When the South African Constitutional Court struck down that na-
tion’s sodomy law,15 it felt called upon to discuss Bowers v. Hardwick,
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure in Bowers either to note or
engage with the argument in the European Human Rights Court’s
Dudgeon decision.  And when the Law Committee of Britain’s
House of Lords, that nation’s highest appellate court, faced an is-
sue of same-sex partner tenant succession rights,16 it cited and dis-
cussed the New York Court of Appeals’ groundbreaking decision on
the same question in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,17 treating it re-
spectfully as a persuasive source of legal argument.
Assuming that there is new receptiveness by the U.S. Supreme
Court to considering human rights developments in other coun-
tries, what would the Court find concerning human rights claims by
sexual minorities?  The most pressing constitutional claims from
this community now involve legal recognition for same-sex part-
ners, equal access to spousal protection under immigration laws,
military service, and legal recognition of acquired gender for
transsexuals.
Canadian courts, interpreting their own Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, have found that the promised equality in Paragraph
15(1) includes a guarantee against discrimination on the basis of
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 15, 16, 18, 23, 25, 31-32, 36-39 and accompanying text.
15. National Coalition v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (12) BCLR 1517 (SA).
16. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling House Association, Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1113 (H.L. 1999).
17. 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989).
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sexual orientation, and that this also encompasses a right to have
long-term committed relationships of same-sex partners recognized
in law.  The courts came to this recognition in stages, at first requir-
ing equality of treatment in particular government programs or
benefits, but ultimately coming to the view, in decisions announced
in 2003 by the highest appellate courts in two provinces, that the
logical direction of human rights law was to culminate in equal ac-
cess to marriage.18  These decisions built on prior rulings by Ca-
nada’s Supreme Court19 and seemed to government leaders so
soundly reasoned that the federal government and the govern-
ments of both affected provinces decided not to appeal.  The fed-
eral government then in office referred to the Supreme Court the
question whether a proposed marriage bill would satisfy all constitu-
tional requirements, and a successor government broadened the
reference to ask the court whether marriage for same-sex couples is
required to satisfy the equality standard.20  In December 2004, the
Court responded, declining to answer the additional question be-
cause the government had failed to appeal the lower court rulings
directly and finding that the Parliament could adopt a federal defi-
nition of marriage that would be binding on the provinces.21  The
Canadian courts invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lov-
ing v. Virginia22 in characterizing the same-sex marriage question as
raising issues analogous to the race discrimination identified by the
U.S. Supreme Court in anti-miscegenation laws and specifically ref-
18. EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, 2003 BCCA 251; Halpern v. Canada, [2003] 65
O.R. 3d 161.  Subsequently, the highest court of Quebec has reached the same conclu-
sion. See Henricks v. Canada, [2004] D.L.R 577 (in French, available at http://www.
jugements.qc.ca/primeur/documents/liguecatholique-19032004.doc).
19. In particular, relying upon cases such as Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop,
[1993] S.C.R. 554, Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513.
20. The Supreme Court heard argument on this issue on October 7 through 9,
2004.  Janice Tibbets, Same Sex Marriage Top Court Challenges Opponents: Last Day of Argu-
ments, NAT’L POST (Canada), Oct. 8, 2004, at A9; Kirk Makin, Supreme Court Date Set on
Same-Sex Marriage Bill, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 21, 2004, at A16.
21. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 079 (Dec. 9, 2004).  The only fault
the Court found with the proposed bill was in its provision excusing objecting religious
organizations from performing same-sex marriages.  The Court observed that under
principles of Canadian federalism, the Parliament has no authority to legislate with
respect to the question who can perform weddings.  However, elsewhere in the opinion
the Court opined that objecting religious organizations could refuse to perform same-
sex weddings as an aspect of the religious liberty protected by the Charter.
22. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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erenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the concept of “sep-
arate but equal.”
The Canadian decisions may presage a similar development in
Europe, as the European Court recently ruled, in Goodwin v. United
Kingdom,23 that Britain’s failure to recognize a long-term marriage
because one of the spouses was a post-operative transsexual violated
the right to respect for private life.  The Goodwin case, apart from its
meaning for marriage rights, was also significant in signaling to
those states bound by European law that respect for private life in-
cludes the right of transgendered persons to legal recognition of
their desired gender identity, an issue as to which state courts in the
United States are sharply divided and the Supreme Court has yet to
speak.24
In 2003, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations
ruled that Australia had violated the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights by denying pension rights to the surviving
same-sex partner of a military veteran.25 Although neither this deci-
sion nor Goodwin directly embraces the right of same-sex partners
to marry, both signal an emerging view internationally that same-
sex partners are entitled to form legally-recognized relationships;26
what rights and responsibilities would accompany such partnerships
23. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002).
24. In recent years, appellate courts in Kansas and Texas have ruled that biologi-
cal sex at birth is determinate on the question of a person’s legal sex for the duration of
their life, while the highest court in Maryland has taken the contrary view, relying in
part on a much older appellate decision from New Jersey. Compare Estate of Marshall
Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Ka.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002) and Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000) with In re Heilig, 816
A.2d 68 (Md. 2003) and M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), cert. denied,
364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976).
25. Views of the Human rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., Communi-
cation No. 941/2000 (2003).
26. This is also supported by the wide array of legislation in Europe according
recognition to same sex partners for various purposes, particularly in France, Germany,
Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, which have legislated forms of registered
partnership, and the Netherlands and Belgium, which allow same-sex partners to
marry.  In Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, Case No. 232/2003 (South Africa Supreme
Court of Appeals, Nov. 30, 2004), the court ruled that the common law definition of
marriage in South Africa must be changed to include same-sex marriage.  The govern-
ment has appealed this ruling to the Constitutional Court.
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would be matters of national law, subject, of course, to the equality
principles embodied in international human rights law.
One American court has already been influenced by the recent
Canadian decisions.  When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,27 that same-
sex partners are entitled to marry, it referred to the Ontario deci-
sion, borrowed its reformulation of the common law definition of
marriage, and appropriated its analysis of some of the asserted state
justifications.  The Canadian justices had demolished arguments
that U.S. state governments continue to make in opposition to mar-
riage claims, especially those involving the role of procreation in
marriage and the contention that the optimum setting for child-
raising is a two-parent household consisting of a father and a
mother.  The Canadian courts pointed out that opposite-sex
couples are not required to prove fertility or a desire to have chil-
dren in order to marry, and that the denial of marriage to same-sex
couples raising children actually penalizes such children by denying
them the stability and benefits provided by marriage.  Although
some American courts, most recently in Arizona28 and New Jersey,29
have refused to engage with the Canadian courts’ arguments, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court apparently found them to be
persuasive.30
27. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
28. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Az. Ct. App. 2003), petition for
review denied, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (2004).  On January 20, 2005, the Court of Appeals
of Indiana rejected a constitutional claim for same-sex marriage, finding that under the
relatively undemanding requirements of the state constitution’s equal benefits clause,
the state’s interest in promoting “responsible procreation” by heterosexuals sufficed to
justify making marriage a solely heterosexual institution.  Morrison v. Sadler, 2005 WL
107151.
29. Lewis v. Harris, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Super.L.) (appeal filed).
30. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949 n.30.  The court stayed its ruling for six months to
give the legislature an opportunity to conform existing laws to the new marriage re-
gime.  Instead, the legislature spent the time trying to figure out ways to evade the
ruling, asked the court whether a civil union law would meet the constitutional require-
ments, and having received a negative response from the court (see Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004)), voted to recommend passage of a
state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages and establishing same-sex
civil unions.  Under Massachusetts law, the proposed amendment will not come before
the voters until November 2006 and must be approved without modification by a subse-
quently elected session of the legislature before it can be placed on the general ballot.
Another example is People v. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Justice Court of N.Y., Town of New
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Turning to immigration, the Constitutional Court of South Af-
rica has ruled that the principle of equality enshrined in that coun-
try’s post-apartheid constitution mandates that the government
recognize committed same-sex partners for purposes of immigra-
tion rights in South Africa,31 a position that has made no headway
in the United States.  Many bi-national same-sex couples in this
country face separation or forced exile because U.S. law treats their
relationships as legally insignificant.  The South African court
noted that many other countries had extended recognition to
same-sex partners in various contexts, citing cases from Canada,
Israel, the United Kingdom, and New York’s Braschi decision.  Jus-
tice Ackerman’s opinion took particular note of how Canadian
courts tied together the concepts of equality and human dignity
when dealing with anti-gay discrimination, concepts which the
South African Constitution explicitly embraces in Sections Nine
(Equality) and Ten (Human Dignity).  Justice Ackerman stated:
This discrimination occurs at a deeply intimate level of
human existence and relationality.  It denies to gays and
lesbians that which is foundational to our Constitution
and the concepts of equality and dignity, which at this
point are closely intertwined, namely that all persons have
the same inherent worth and dignity as human beings,
whatever their other differences may be.  The denial of
equal dignity and worth all too quickly and insidiously
degenerates into a denial of humanity and leads to inhu-
man treatment by the rest of society in many other ways.
This is deeply demeaning and frequently has the cruel ef-
fect of undermining the confidence and sense of self-
worth and self-respect of lesbians and gays.32
Paltz 2004), in which a trial judge ruled that the state’s refusal to let same-sex couples
marry violates the federal and state constitutions, in the context of dismissing criminal
charges against Jason West, the mayor of New Paltz, who performed weddings for same-
sex couples who had been denied licenses.  Judge Jonathan D. Katz did not cite any
New York case authority, but referred generally to decisions from other states.
31. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs,
1999 (2) SA 1 (CC).
32. Id. at 36.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR203.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-MAR-05 9:12
2004] SEXUAL MINORITY RIGHTS 533
U.S. Representative Jerrold Nadler (D.- N.Y.) has introduced a bill,
the Permanent Partners Immigration Act,33 that would establish
such a policy, but has not been able to obtain hearings in the Re-
publican-controlled House of Representatives.  Before that bill ad-
vances, U.S. courts will likely face the issue directly when a bi-
national couple in which one member is an American citizen, hav-
ing married in Canada or Massachusetts, seeks the benefit of
spousal preference provisions.34  If the promise of equality for gay
Americans embodied in Lawrence v. Texas is meaningful, might an
American court be inspired by the South Africa Constitutional
Court’s ruling on immigration rights, based on the same concepts
of equality and human dignity described by Justice Kennedy?
One could give more examples, but I have time for only one:
the ability of openly-gay people to serve in the military.  The U.S.
Supreme Court has denied review to numerous cases in which fed-
eral appeals courts rejected First and Fifth Amendment challenges
either to the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy or its predecessor
exclusionary policies.35  If Congress does not repeal the ban, some
day the Supreme Court must confront this question, and in so do-
ing it could look to a pair of 1999 rulings by the European Court of
Human Rights, Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom36 and
33. H.R. 832, 108th Cong. (2003).  Representative Nadler enlisted 128 co-sponsors
for the bill in the House.
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a), which would be amended by adding the phrase “or
permanent partnership” after “marriage” and by providing a definition for permanent
partners.
35. See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army National Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Thorne v. U.S. Department of Defense, 139 F.3d 893
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 947 (1998); Selland v. Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom Selland v. Cohen, 520 U.S. 1210 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1020 (1992); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied sub nom Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Beller v. Mitten-
dorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).  Plaintiffs in these
cases have argued that the service ban violates rights of equal protection and privacy,
and under the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, the right of freedom of speech, but none of
the challenges has succeeded.  The lack of a split in circuit authority has undoubtedly
contributed to the Supreme Court’s refusal to take a gay military case for review, but it
seems likely that after Lawrence v. Texas, a circuit split will eventually develop if Congress
does not repeal the policy.
36. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, 587 (1999)
(finding that the plaintiffs were wrongly discharged “on the grounds of their homosex-
uality”), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htm.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR203.txt unknown Seq: 10  1-MAR-05 9:12
534 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom,37 holding that Britain’s ban on
military service by gay people violated the European Convention’s
requirement that member nations show respect for the privacy and
family lives of their citizens.  The European Court found that the
military policy, which necessarily involved intrusive investigations
into the sex lives of military applicants and members, had not been
justified by the government sufficiently to support abridging basic
human rights.  Responding to the ruling, Britain repealed its ban,
and has not experienced any significant problems integrating
openly-gay members into its forces.  Neither have the many other
U.S. military allies who now allow openly-gay members to serve, in-
cluding Canada, the other European Union countries, and Israel.
Although the U.S. Constitution does not specifically mention
respect for privacy or family life, the U.S. Supreme Court has em-
braced those concepts in cases arising under the Due Process
Clause, especially those protecting the autonomy of parents to de-
cide how to raise their children,38 and the right of individuals to
control their procreative functions.39  The Supreme Court has only
begun to apply those concepts to sexual minorities in Lawrence.  Jus-
tice Kennedy spoke in terms of “liberty” rather than “privacy” when
striking down the Texas sodomy law, confirming a trend in the
Court away from privacy rhetoric in Due Process cases.40  But the
European Court’s application of this concept in the context of mili-
tary personnel investigations falls comfortably within the same ideas
of respect for privacy and individual dignity.  Perhaps, especially as
all of our major military allies let openly gay people serve, a Su-
preme Court newly sensitive to situations where America is out of
37. Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, 523 (1999) (finding
that the applicants were denied “respect for their private lives” when dismissed from the
military on the grounds of their homosexuality), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
eng/Judgments.htm.
38. See, for example, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), cases frequently
invoked for the proposition that the Due Process Clause protects parental discretion in
making decisions about how to raise their children from government interference.
39. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
40. This trend was first signaled in Casey, 505 U.S. 833, where the Court upheld a
woman’s constitutional right to chose abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy
based on the concept of “liberty” rather than “privacy.”
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step with the world community will see fit to overturn the ban.  A
court that has stated that our Constitution does not recognize “clas-
ses among citizens”41 should do no less.
While decisions by international human rights tribunals and
the high courts of other countries do not establish binding prece-
dents for the interpretation of our Constitution, they can provide
persuasive precedents, as well as evidence of widely accepted pro-
positions concerning the basic rights that lesbians and gay men
ought to enjoy in any democratic republic.
41. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, at 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion)).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR203.txt unknown Seq: 12  1-MAR-05 9:12
